

## Message Text

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TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

S E C R E T STATE 035334

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMORANDUM: YOUR MEETING WITH IRISH

- FOREIGN MINISTER FITZGERALD IN PARIS ON FEB 18

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

GENEVA AND BONN FOR S/S

1. CHECKLIST:

-- EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE - EXPLORE EC'S CONCEPT OF TECHNICAL  
LEVEL TALKS WITH THE ARABS.

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-- EC/IRAN - REITERATE OUR OPPOSITION TO A PREFERENTIAL  
EC/IRAN AGREEMENT.

-- EC EMISSARY TO CYPRUS - DISCUSS WHETHER LATEST DEVELOP-

MENTS WILL AFFECT EC PLANS FOR SENDING AN EMISSARY TO CYPRUS, GREECE, AND TURKEY.

-- ENERGY - STRESS OUR HOPE THAT WE CAN MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO ACHIEVE THE THIRD PRE-CONDITION FOR THE PREPCON.

## 2. SETTING:

-- FITZGERALD HAS ASKED FOR THIS MEETING TO DISCUSS US-EC ISSUES IN HIS CAPACITY AS EC SPOKESMAN. HE HAS MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY THE EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE AND THE EC'S DESIRE TO

SEND AN EMISSARY TO CYPRUS, GREECE AND TURKEY. THE MEETING WILL CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE WITH FITZGERALD, AS EC PRESIDENT, WHICH YOU COMMENCED DURING HIS JANUARY 8 VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

-- UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED, FITZGERALD WILL MOST LIKELY PASS ON TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE EC NINE A FULL ACCOUNT OF YOUR CONVERSATION, AS WOULD BE EXPECTED OF HIM IN HIS EC PRESIDENCY ROLE. SINCE THE EC NINE FOREIGN MINISTERS HAVE JUST MET IN DUBLIN ON THE 13TH, WHERE THEY REPORTEDLY DISCUSSED WAYS TO MOVE AHEAD ON BOTH THE EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE AND THEIR CYPRUS EMISSARY PROPOSAL, YOUR MEETING WITH FITZGERALD SHOULD PROVIDE YOU WITH TIMELY OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT BEFORE THE NINE ACTUALLY MOVE FORWARD ON THESE ISSUES.

## 3. ISSUES/TALKING POINTS:

### 3-A EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE

-- EC POSITION - AT FEBRUARY 13 POLITICAL COOPERATION MEETING, EC NINE FOREIGN MINISTERS DEFERRED FINAL DECISION ON DENATIONALIZED EXPERTS FORMULA, PENDING OUTCOME SECRETARY'S MIDEAST TALKS AND EUROPEAN VISITS. CURRENT EC GUIDELINES APPLY ONLY TO PREPARATORY MEETING SEPARATE FROM  
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DIALOGUE AND DO NOT IMPLY COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE OF PLO CLAIMS. GIVEN "EMERGING CONSENSUS" ON EXPERTS APPROACH, EC IS RECEPTIVE TO US CONSULTATION BEFORE MAKING FORMAL DECISION AND APPROACHING ARABS. SEE DUBLIN 317 FOR SPECIFICS AND IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED GUIDELINES.

-- USG POSITION - UNTIL NOW, THE NINE HAVE NOT OFFICIALLY ASKED US FOR OUR POSITION ON PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE. IN YOUR CONVERSATION WITH CALLAGHAN ON JANUARY 30, YOU MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE VIEW THE INCLUSION OF THE PLO AS A POLITICAL EVENT, WHICH WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO DISGUISE FOR LONG, EVEN IN A TECHNICAL DIALOGUE. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE US SHOULD STOP

SHORT OF TELLING THE EC FLATLY THAT WE OPPOSE ANY FORWARD MOVEMENT IN THE DIALOGUE IF THE PLO IS INVOLVED. THE NINE ARE WELL AWARE OF OUR GENERAL CONCERN, AND ANY SPECIFIC REPRESENTATION ON THE PLO COULD: (A) STRAIN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE NINE IF WE LATER DECIDE TO MOVE TOWARDS THE PLO; (B) CREATE RESENTMENT THAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO DICTATE HOW THE NINE SHOULD PURSUE THEIR INTERESTS; (C) IRRITATE EGYPT AND SYRIA; (D) ADD MOMENTUM TO THE PLO SURGE IF OUR REPRESENTATION FAILED; AND (E) NOT DETER THE NINE AT ANY RATE IF THEY THOUGHT THE DIALOGUE MIGHT OTHERWISE COLLAPSE.

- R TALKING POINTS:

-- WE DO NOT OPPOSE THE DESIRE OF THE NINE AND THE COMMUNITY TO PROMOTE CLOSER ECONOMIC/CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB NATIONS THROUGH THE EC/ARAB DIALOGUE. WE REMAIN CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT THE DIALOGUE MIGHT GET INTO AREAS THAT WOULD COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND OUR EFFORTS TO WORK OUT CONSUMER COOPERATION ON ENERGY MATTERS, AND WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THE IRISH WOULD KEEP US INFORMED IN SOME DETAIL OF DEVELOPMENTS.

-- WE TRUST THAT THE EC WILL CONTINUE TO STAND BY ITS PLEDGE NOT TO MAKE OIL OR MIDDLE EAST POLITICS A PART OF DIALOGUE.

-- SO LONG AS THE PLO ENDORSES THE USE OF TERRORISM IN ISRAEL, AND REMAINS DEDICATED TO THE ULTIMATE DISAPPEAR-  
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ANCE OF ISRAEL AS A SOVEREIGN STATE, IT IS DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO CONCEIVE AN ISRAELI/PLO NEGOTIATION. INTERNATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS OF THE PLO IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEREFORE, ARE NOT HELPFUL BECAUSE THEY CREATE AN IMPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE PLO WITHOUT ENHANCING THE POSSIBILITIES OF ACHIEVING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN THE AREA.

--THE PRESENCE OF THE PLO IN A TECHNICAL DIALOGUE CANNOT HELP BUT INJECT A POLITICAL ELEMENT INTO THE DIALOGUE.

3-B EC/IRAN

-- USG POSITION - THE US IS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO EC OR EC MEMBER STATES PREFERENTIAL BILATERAL DEALS WITH OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES. A PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE EC AND IRAN WOULD ENDANGER A COORDINATED CONSUMER APPROACH TO THE ENERGY CRISIS. THE US HAS ALSO LONG OPPOSED THE PROLIFERATION OF EC PREFERENTIAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. IN A MODUS VIVENDI WORKED OUT IN 1973 US-EC CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN FORMER UNDER SECRETARY CASEY AND SIR CHRISTOPHER SOAMES, WE AGREED NOT TO OBJECT

TO THE EC'S ARRANGEMENTS WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF LDC ASSOCIATED STATES AND THE EC MADE SEVERAL COMMITMENTS INCLUDING ONE NOT TO CONCLUDE PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES. NEW EC DISCRIMINATORY TRADE MEASURES WOULD ALSO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE THRUST OF THE MTN NEGOTIATIONS TO FURTHER EXPAND WORLD TRADE ON AN MFN BASIS.

-- EC POSITION - FRANCE AND DENMARK SUPPORT A BROAD PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENT WITH IRAN, THE FRENCH HAVING REVERSED THEIR POSITION DURING PRIME MINISTER CHIRAC'S DECEMBER 1974

VISIT TO IRAN. THE GERMANS DESIRE A NARROW AGREEMENT TO ALLOW DUTY FREE ENTRY INTO THE COMMUNITY OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS PRODUCED BY A JOINT GERMAN-IRANIAN REFINERY. MOST OF THE OTHER MEMBER COUNTRIES HAVE NOT TAKEN A FIRM POSITION IN COUNCIL MEETINGS, ALTHOUGH THE ITALIANS HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR STRONG MISGIVINGS TO US PRIVATELY. THE UK AND THE COMMISSION, HAVE OPPOSED THE PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENT.

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MENT, WITH THE LATTER TAKING A PARTICULARLY ACTIVE ROLE RECOMMENDING A NON-PREFERENTIAL TYPE OF COOPERATION AGREEMENT. AT THE FEBRUARY 10 COUNCIL MEETING, THE MINISTERS DIRECTED THE COMMISSION TO CONTACT THE IRANIANS AND GET A MORE COMPLETE READING OF THEIR INTEREST.

-- TALKING POINTS:

-- THE UNITED STATES OPPOSES BILATERAL PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS BECAUSE THEY DISTORT NORMAL COMPETITIVE TRADE PATTERNS, UNDERMINE THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM AND VIOLATE GATT RULES PROSCRIBING SUCH DISCRIMINATORY TRADE PRACTICES.

-- WE HAVE A COMMITMENT FROM THE COMMUNITY, UNDER THE 1973 CASEY-SOAMES AGREEMENT, THAT THERE WOULD BE NO GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION OF ITS PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS. WE FIND IT BOTH SURPRISING AND DISAPPOINTING THAT FRANCE AND SOME OTHER COMMUNITY MEMBERS WOULD CONSIDER VIOLATING THIS AGREEMENT.

-- A PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT WOULD ALSO PUT IN JEOPARDY OUR POLICY OF SEEKING ENERGY CRISIS SOLUTIONS BASED ON CONSUMER SOLIDARITY. IT WOULD BECOME DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE A COMMON CONSUMER POSITION ON TRADE/INVESTMENT RELATIONSHIPS FOR A CONFERENCE WITH PRODUCERS, IF THE EC IS SIMULTANEOUSLY MAKING DISCRIMINATORY ARRANGEMENTS WITH ONE OR MORE PRODUCERS AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHERS. THIS CLEARLY RISKS PUTTING THE EC ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH US.

-- WE APPRECIATE THE COMMUNITY'S WISH TO BUILD A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN BUT URGE THAT THIS BE DONE THROUGH MFN AND GENERALIZED PREFERENCES--NOT THROUGH THE TYPE OF SPECIAL BILATERAL PREFERENTIAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAVE GROWN OUT OF FORMER EC MEMBER COLONIAL RELATIONSHIPS.

3-C EC EMISSARY TO CYPRUS

-- EC POSITION - IN A STATEMENT RELEASED BY THE EC FOREIGN MINISTERS FOLLOWING THEIR FEBRUARY 13 POLITICAL COOPERATION MEETING, THE NINE REAFFIRMED THEIR CONCERN ABOUT

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THE CYPRUS SITUATION. RECALLING THE RELATIONS OF ASSOCIATION WHICH LINK THE EC TO GREECE, TURKEY, AND THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AND THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE COMMUNITY ATTACHES TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF CYPRUS, THE EC PLANS TO MAKE CONTACT THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THE EC PRESIDENCY WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF CYPRUS, GREECE, AND TURKEY. THE NINE WILL STRESS THE DESIRABILITY OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES AND THE EC'S WILLINGNESS TO FACILITATE THAT PROCESS.

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-- USG POSITION - WE, TOO, FAVOR THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS POSSIBLE POLITICAL SOLUTION TO PROBLEMS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. WE HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN TRYING TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS FORWARD AND TO SUPPLY HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FOR CYPRIOT REFUGEES. THOUGH WE ARE DOUBTFUL THAT THE EC CAN ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING ON CYPRUS--PARTICULARLY WITH THE HEIGHTENED TENSION OCCASIONED BY THE PROCLAMATION OF AN AUTONOMOUS TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION--WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO EC PEACE-SEEKING EFFORTS. WE REGRET THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF AN INDEPENDENT TURKISH ZONE AND CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. WE WILL PERSIST IN ADVOCATING TALKS BETWEEN GREEK AND TURKISH LEADERS.

-- YOUR TALKING POINTS:

-- WE HAVE APPRECIATED THE HELPFUL ROLE PLAYED BY THE EC ON THE CYPRUS QUESTION AND SHARE THE COMMUNITY'S DESIRE TO ACHIEVE A PROMPT NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

--FOR OUR PART, WE INTEND TO PERSEVERE IN CONTINUING EFFORTS TO RETURN TO "THE PATH OF NEGOTIATIONS" IN CYPRUS.

3-DENERGY

-- IF TIME PERMITS A DISCUSSION OF ENERGY, YOU MAY WANT TO DRAW ON THE MATERIAL IN THE BRIEFING BOOK PREPARED FOR YOUR CONVERSATIONS IN BONN, PARIS, AND LONDON. INGERSOLL

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